30 Years Hedong 30 Years, Hexi "Jinjiang Shoe Enterprises" Can Rebuild Legend?

A dream of Hua Xu finally became empty.

The company went bankrupt and delisted, and the boss of the alligator lost his job. He lost 636 million yuan in debt and went out of business. When the hidden iceberg was prized open, the world was surprised to find that those gorgeous shoes under the shoes of Jinjiang were in ruins and full of lice.

No one expected such an outcome.

From the impoverished small fishing village in Fujian to the prestigious "China Shoes Capital", from the first pair of sports shoes to the famous sports brand, from the half of the Chinese shoe industry to the near extinction, 30 years ago, Jinjiang shoe enterprises wrote a legendary romance that was enough to go down in history.

At one time, the birth and development of the Jinjiang sports brand was widely praised for its rich magic realism. However, it seemed as if a terrible fate had taken place. Problems such as unsalable sales, huge debts, discontinued production and bankruptcy had followed. The old rings were all crushed into mud until they were completely swallowed up by the tide of the times.

A new force suddenly rises

For Jinjiang shoe enterprises, 1980s is the starting point of the whole "shoe making campaign".

Collective entrepreneurship is not accidental.

In October 1983, driven by the new economic mode, Lin Tuqiu, the founder of the alligator, founded the Yang Dai shoe and hat factory, knocking out the first pair of sneakers in the dilapidated stone house and earning 80 thousand yuan in the first year.

The story of the shoe and hat factory quickly spread in the town of Chen Dai.

In the same year, Ding Jiantong, who lived on fishing grounds, made up 2000 yuan to set up the 361 - degree predecessor, Huafeng shoe factory. In 1989, Xu Jingnan set up the shoe factory with the money saved by the scooter, which was later PEAK, which planted the fire for the prosperity of Jinjiang sporting goods manufacturing industry.

In the following 90s, more than 3000 shoe and garment factories, including Golden Lake, Lu You, Xi long, Anta, XTEP and so on, were born in Jinjiang.

It is these "wilderness" who believe in "fight to win" and stir up the whole Chinese sports shoes market.

However, it did not last long. The Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997 was like a heavy blow. The sharp decline in overseas orders, continuing to engage in processing or developing its own brand became a difficult problem faced by many shoe factory owners in Jinjiang.

In 1999, Anta, as a "breaker", hit 800 thousand heavily to sign Kong Linghui, who has just won the world champion of men's table tennis as spokesperson, and Hao threw 3 million in the golden section of CCTV for advertising bombing, so sales exceeded 300 million mark.

Seeing that Anta was a big gun, the fellow townsmen watching the fire off the coast had heard the story.

Almost the front and rear feet, XTEP found Nicholas Tse, Xi Long lung signed Aaron Kwok, Kim lake, aiming at Wang Nan and Zhang Yining, and del Hui took the "low stance" Jay Chou in the battle of grabbing people.

Within a few short months, Jinjiang came up with more than 1400 brands quickly, looking for endorsements everywhere. CCTV-5 was once dubbed "Jinjiang channel".

After 2000, the Olympic bid was successful, the men's football appeared, and the WTO was joined.

The good news is like a needle "strong heart", which stimulates Jinjiang shoe companies to keep running.

In 2005, Hongxing Erke took the lead in listing in Singapore. In 2007, Anta landed at the Hong Kong stock exchange. Its market value soared to HK $20 billion and became the fifth sports brand in the world. In 2008, XTEP was listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, and its founder Ding Shuibo was worth up to HK $5 billion. Before 2009, many brands such as heeron, PEAK and 361 degrees entered the international capital market, and Jinjiang shoe enterprises entered the peak period.

This stage of Jinjiang brand can be described as flourishing and has its own advantages. It not only firmly locked the middle end seats in the sports brand market, but also had the power to encroach on the more high-end level.

When the market was the most popular, the spring and autumn order meeting, which was originally two times a year, was changed to four times a year due to insufficient supply.

After listing and financing, Jinjiang shoe companies that are more emboldened have begun to expand their horsepower expansion.

In 2011, the number of XTEP stores rose from 3000 to 7596, and the number of 361 outlets from 4632 in 2008 to 7682 in 2011, while PEAK achieved nearly 8000 in two years on the basis of 6000 stores in 2009.

In the same year, the Jinjiang economic and Trade Commission released a group of arrogant data: the footwear industry accounted for 40% of the annual output of the footwear industry and 20% of the world's total, achieving 60 billion of the industry's output value.

The poor county, which still lives on the "relief" in 1978, has been in the economically developed and world-famous county-level city. Jinjiang's counterattack only took 23 years to become an insurmountable myth of China's footwear industry.

As the giant wheel continues to move forward, Jinjiang's economic aggregate and industrial scale continue to expand rapidly with a great inertia, and do not feel the undersea surge.

Kings fall

After the highest point of the parabola, the next fall is falling.

The "sports craze" brought about by the 2008 Olympic Games lasted for only two years, and the situation turned steeply. "Shortage" became an "excess". The stock of the major sports brands in Jinjiang was already large.

The disaster is not alone, along with the rise in labor costs and appreciation of the renminbi, a series of strikes followed, broken capital chain, homogenization, inventory backlog, big influx of foreign brands, electric shock.

Without support, many small and medium-sized enterprises are falling down.

The shoe companies that made the plates bigger by listing are also doomed.

Suspected financial fraud was suspended at the Singapore Stock Exchange, and in 2014, the A, which was hard to squeeze into the shares of the company, turned out to be a bad performance in the first year. Its revenue and net profit decreased by 20% and 26% respectively compared with the previous year before the listing. The owners of the odd and crocodile markets chose the same route in the same year. In 2010 and 2011, the loss of the company's annual turnover of about 3000000000 was as high as that of the gold lake, and only a few remained. In 2016, the net profit of 361 degrees had dropped to 400 million yuan, and PEAK sports had also been delisted in the same year. In the case of backdoor listing in 2009, the stock price of the highest reached 13.69 dollars was declared bankrupt in 2016. 2011, Hongxing Erke

In spite of the internal and external troubles, the glory of the past is gone forever. The rapid change of the market has accelerated this process, but from the beginning, the decline of Jinjiang shoe enterprises is more dependent on its own factors.

1. familial phenomenon is widespread, management confusion is difficult to grow.

The early Jinjiang shoe enterprises all started from the "family joint production and manual workshop". The family concept was heavy and the exclusiveness was strong. Even though the business grew more and more popular over the next few decades, the impact brought about by the roots had not disappeared.

It is not a problem to put in dozens of shoes and shoes factories, but when the company has become a large enterprise that sells billions or billions of dollars, the disadvantages of lacking modern management system become a time bomb.

The data are enough to illustrate the problem.

The Jinjiang government admitted in the 2016 Jinjiang sports industry development research that although there are more than 5000 sports industry enterprises, the number of enterprises with more than 5 billion yuan output value is less than that of enterprises with more than 10 billion yuan.

For the fall of del Hui, senior staff members have denied the management of their stores, and the executives of the channel haven't done anything. They have no sense of doing things.

This long-standing malpractice is also particularly prominent during the listing period.

Because of the operation of the family, people who are not very trusted can not meddle, resulting in complex funding for Jinjiang shoe enterprises and grey accounts.

Because of the failure of the finance to pass the audit, he suddenly stopped the listing ten days before the company's IPO.

Seemingly unimportant problems are often chronic poisons, like rust that is not noticed, even if the iron armor is cast, it will eventually be eroded and collapsed.

2., floating on the surface to seek scale, not thinking of life becoming abandoned.

Jinjiang bosses dare to work hard and have strong learning ability, but they are so limited in their vision that they often lose the good situation.

In 90s, he started to build a brand of Jinjiang shoe enterprises, but he was willing to be a substitute factory for ADI and Nike for a long time. Until 1998, it was changed under the strong guidance of the government.

But until 2004, the Jinjiang municipal government was still spending 18 million yuan to reward the brand companies.

Before the outbreak of the inventory crisis, the life of Jinjiang shoe enterprises was quite comfortable.

Previously, the positioning of the Jinjiang department was "brand wholesale company". As long as the merchandise was handed over to the dealer, even if the sale was completed, as far as goods sold were more or less, and how to sell, they would not ask, making money would be good, and gradually formed fatal delays. Finally, they could not resist in the cold wave.

In the circle, "building more factories and opening more stores" is the inertia thinking of the Jinjiang bosses. The enterprises are fighting hard all the year round to develop the speed of distributors and distribution channels. At that time, even the official competition ranking has even appeared, so as to see who can compare them.

At that time, great changes were taking place in the market.

Too fast expansion makes the industry concentration more serious, the product homogenization is serious, and the pformation of the international sports brand is becoming popular.

Faced with the new demand brought by the upgrading of consumption, the pformation of retail mode is imperative.

However, some enterprises have not only embarked on retail pformation, but also stuck to past experience and made strategic mistakes.

In 2012, Hongxing Erke and "noble bird" and other enterprises proposed to pform into life casual clothes. The proportion of this category was once more than 50%. However, the competition in the fast fashion industry is more brutal, and the inventory and cash flow crisis of enterprises is becoming worse.

But XTEP did not start pformation until 2015, and 361 degrees is still on the way to exploration.

3. ignore the risk behind, compare the listing and taste the bitter fruit.

Before 2007, there were only 5 listed companies in Jinjiang, such as Heng An, Feng Zhu, and seven wolves. But with the increase of wealth in 2007 when Anta Hongkong listed, the listing of Jinjiang shoe enterprises became unmanageable. The listing of enterprises has become an important symbol of Jinjiang entrepreneurs' success.

In fact, more companies do not follow the law of value creation. Instead, they are speculating and comparing psychology, financial fraud, capital turnover, and even delisting and then fighting to other markets. These are the tacit manipulation practices of some enterprises in Jinjiang.

The price of blind listing is painful.

What is unknown to the outside world is that the financing cost of listing is very high. The funds that will be melted will not be immediately arrived at the accounts. In order to whitewash the earnings reports, enterprises need not only to pay taxes, but also to pay a fee for "planning companies". Taxes and fees are generally in the tens of millions to hundreds of millions of yuan, and the packaging fees are in the level of 100 million yuan.

Del Hui, which had a good momentum, was largely dragged down by the rush to go public.

Financial fraud, founder's misfortune, and IPO have been broken down for nearly 8 years. In the past few years, del Hui has failed to win the brand and business in a vicious circle. Assets have been auctioned off by mortgage and completely shut down.

Aftershocks are still there.

In 2018, Jinjiang footwear enterprises were collectively accused by GMT. In its report, they claimed that 9 of China's 16 sporting goods listed companies have been proved to be "cheaters" in recent years, while the remaining 7 companies, Anta, XTEP and 361 degree financial data are also similar to those "cheater" companies, and the industry is in an uproar.

Listing again delisting, Jinjiang shoe enterprises are proud of the appearance of the stage, but in a state of embarrassing ending, know today, why.

Where is the way?

From the emergence of the rudiment to the drain of yellow sand, the current Jinjiang shoe industry, apart from several domestic first-line brands occupy the throne of sports brand, once the Jinjiang two or three line sports brand is basically annihilated.

In the fierce attack of foreign giants Nike and Adidas, the shuffle continues.

It is gratifying to note that after experiencing wildly running wildly, crazy listing and painful pformation, the Jinjiang footwear industry, which is restarting, is breaking the tide and breaking the market.

In 2009, Anta acquired Italy's high-end sports brand FILA with HK $600 million. Now it has become an important driving force for Anta's growth. In 2017, the China Daily reported that FILA accounted for 20% of Anta's revenue.

In addition to the internationalization of brand strategy, product upgrading is also a new strategy.

In recent years, you have invested in many fields such as professional football equipment retailers, sports fitness technology applications, competition hosts and professional team brokers.

In terms of innovative research and development, 361 degrees are catching up. The sports equipment ergonomics research center and the functional sports equipment R & D center are very representative in their counterparts, and even begin to do research in the way of life and sports concepts.

30 years Hedong, 30 years Hexi, everything is far from the key.

There is still much room for China's sports industry. Can Jinjiang shoe enterprises regenerate a new legend? Let's wait and see.